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Abstract 
The case ‘Santander Acquires Abbey: The Jack Project’ examines the managerial decision-
making process in 2004 prior to the acquisition of Abbey. The primary argument highlights how 
the strategic management of information systems is a ‘core competence’ within the Santander’s 
growth strategy based on mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Students are asked to put themselves 
in the position of José María Fuster (CIO Grupo Santander). Their first task is to assess the 
information technology (IT) strategies of Santander and Abbey, and understand their value and 
roles. The second task is to explore the differences between ‘customer-centric’ and ‘product 
centric’ IT platforms and their alignment with business and growth strategies. As a final task, 
students are asked to assess how this merger could be performed by leveraging the IT capacity 
that Grupo Santander had developed for the acquisition – despite the doubts expressed about its 
feasibility by financial analysts. The case was written for general management programs, as well 
as MBA and executive MBA degree courses in information systems strategy.  
Keywords: teaching cases, strategy on information systems, IT platforms, mergers & acquisitions 
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Introduction: Somewhere over the European Sky, June 2004 
 
José María Fuster, the recently appointed Chief Information Officer (CIO) of Grupo Santander was fastening his 
seat belt on a private jet that was taking off from London’s Farnborough airport bound for Madrid. His fellow 
passengers included Alfredo Sáenz, CEO of Grupo Santander, Francisco Gómez, Chief Financial Officer (CFO), a 
multidisciplinary team of twenty managers, as well as a Merrill Lynch task force of investment analysts and lawyers 
specialised in mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Fuster looked over the ‘Jack Project’ report, the secret code name 
for the takeover of the Abbey Bank that Grupo Santander’s management was designing as a spearhead for expansion 
in Europe and a consolidation of its global strategy.  
At the beginning of 2004, Santander’s capitalisation was €38 billion, while Abbey’s capitalisation was €18 billion. 
Santander management wanted to buy Abbey for €13 billion (£8.6 billion)
1
 knowing that the acquisition of Abbey 
would require Spanish market resources and international market support to lever the operation through a complex 
share float. They were also aware that rumours could increase Abbey’s stock value and jeopardise the operation. 
Fuster and Sáenz knew that the banking sector had never before seen a similar cross-border takeover. Investment 
analysts had worked out that such a deal would be feasible if Grupo Santander could generate €450 million in 
synergies over a three-year period. By the same token, analysts did not believe it was possible to generate synergies 
without overlapping branch networks, support, and central services.  
The jet reached cruising altitude and hit an air pocket, making the coffee cups rattle. One of the Merrill Lynch 
partners said to Fuster, ‘This isn’t going to come off since cross-border deals don’t work. Why should Santander be 
any luckier in finding synergies? Where are you going to find opportunities for cost-cutting?’ Fuster and the 
executives at Santander firmly believed that the deal would work because IT was the driving force behind the bank’s 
M&A strategy. Fuster, however, was wondering how to convince the market to fund the operation. He thought that 
the Abbey acquisition should be presented to investors as an IT-centric story that drew on Santander’s ability to 
optimise banking operations and generate cost structure synergies by combining the resources of both banks. 
Despite the success of previous acquisitions, Fuster knew that the ‘Jack Project’ had been drawn up after studying 
Abbey’s financial development from public sources and that the market had never before seen a similar 
transnational M&A. The challenge was to marshal arguments to convince the market that Santander was capable of 
delivering the IT synergies that had eluded other banks in the past. 
Grupo Santander 
Grupo Santander (GS) had €351.8 billion in assets, 103,038 staff, and 9,199 branches in 2003. The bank was 
founded in 1857 by Rafael Botín and in little over 150 years had grown from a tiny local bank to become a global 
bank with more than 69 million customers in over 40 countries. Santander’s main business focus was retail banking, 
contributing 82% of the group’s profit. The remaining 18% of the group’s net attributable income came from asset 
management and private banking, as well as global wholesale banking. Emilio Botín, President of GS in 2004, 
noted:  
‘Firstly, Grupo Santander’s success is based on sticking to retail banking, which is its core competence. 
Secondly, the bank is very aggressive in commercial terms. Thirdly, the bank is very prudent when it 
comes to managing risks and lending’. 
                                                          
1 €1 = 0.664 pound sterling as at 31 May 2004.   
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The bank’s history dates back to a decree signed by Queen Isabel II authorising the creation of a bank to issue and 
discount bank notes in Santander.
2
 Spain’s central bank, the Banco de España,
3
 was given the exclusive right to 
issue bank notes to Banco Santander in 1875 and from then on Banco Santander (BS) focused on retail banking. Its 
strategy was based on prudent lending and strict risk control.  
BS started its expansion in Spain in the 1950s. In 1957 Emilio Botín Sr. (the great grandson of Rafael Botín) agreed 
a remarkable operation when he closed a deal with FC Barcelona
4
 to fund the building of a club stadium, called 
Camp Nou. In return, BS would manage the assets of FC Barcelona for a ten-year period. Moreover, FC Barcelona 
undertook to ask its 30,000 members to open an account at BS. This allowed BS to develop its branch network in 
Catalonia. By 1957, the bank’s 100
th
 anniversary, it had become the seventh largest bank in Spain. In 1986, Emilio 
Botín Jr. was appointed president.  
Foreign banks began entering the Spanish market in 1989. Previously, the country’s seven biggest banks (Banco 
Santander, Banco Bilbao, Banco Vizcaya, Banco Popular, Banesto, Banco Central, Banco Hispano Americano) held 
frequent meetings where they reached ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ to keep competition at bay. As a result, few banks 
tried to woo customers away from their rivals. The growth strategy was to capture new customers by expanding 
networks in areas where few people had bank accounts and by not paying interest on current accounts – no matter 
how large the balance. This cosy arrangement was torn to shreds in 1989 when BS launched one of the most 
innovative products in Spain’s banking history, the ‘Supercuenta’ [Super Account], which paid 11% at a time when 
interest rates were hovering around 15%. Banco Santander deposits grew by leaps and bounds, giving the bank the 
financial muscle to acquire other entities. As any BS member of staff will tell you, one of president Botín’s favourite 
sayings is ‘It’s the early bird that gets the worm’. 
In 1988, BS forged an alliance with The Royal Bank of Scotland, putting Banco Santander on the European banking 
map. In 1994, the bank bought Banco Español de Crédito (Banesto) at public auction. The general public had taken 
it for granted that Banco Bilbao Vizcaya bank would acquire Banesto. Yet Emilio Botín won the auction by making 
a bid of €1.7 billion. Some felt the figure was far too high.   
BS merged with Banco Central Hispanoamericano in 1999, the largest and third largest Spanish banks respectively. 
Of the seven big Spanish banks in 1989, BS had bought three in ten years. In 1999, BS consolidated its network in 
Latin America, buying and establishing around fifty banks. The size of the new bank allowed it to fund a new series 
of acquisitions in the period 1999-04.
5
 
The IT vision 
The IT story in Grupo Santander started in the 1970s when most European banks introduced computers to automate 
administrative tasks in the back-office – such as accounting, billing, payroll, etc. These back-office applications 
grew to embrace product applications and then became strategic investments. This occurred because all products and 
their related operations (such as account management or mortgages) were based on software applications that were 
stored and run on mainframe computer systems. The use of IT in the Spanish retail banking sector gained 
momentum from the 1980s onwards in response to Banco de España guidelines to cut transaction costs, reduce 
paperwork, improve security, and reduce the scope for fraud. Banks also started putting more emphasis on the use of 
IT for front-office operations. In particular, a wide range of additional distribution channels such as Automatic Teller 
Machines (ATMs) [cash dispensers], call-centres and on-line banking services, were developed. Fuster added:  
‘Retail banking is highly dependent on IT architecture since it affects the efficiency ratio, which measures 
the unit cost of income – in other words, how many euros the bank spends for each hundred euros it 
makes’. 
The 1980s and 90s the European retail banking sector saw various national mergers and acquisitions aiming to 
achieve greater scale in a new global landscape. Yet from the point of view of information systems Fuster 
commented:  
                                                          
2 Santander is a city on the northern coast of Spain. 
3 The Banco de España is the national central bank and supervises the Spanish banking system (http://www.bde.es) 
4 Football Club Barcelona, http://www.fcbarcelona.cat 
5 Totta & Açores and Crédito Predial Portugués in Portugal; Banespa in Brazil; Grupo Financiero Serfin in Mexico; Banco Santiago in Chile; AKB Group in 
Germany; Finconsumo in Italy; PTF in Poland; ELCON in Norway; and ABFIN in The Netherlands. 
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‘However, there was virtually no integration among these new applications given that they were built at 
different points in time. This made for loose co-ordination between the front office and back office and 
internal departments. As a result, customer information did not flow easily across the organisation.’  
In this context, a common problem for the banking industry was the rising complexity of IT management. In the 
early nineties, BS faced increasing operational complexity as a result of the bank’s aggressive growth strategy 
driven by mergers and acquisitions. This led to Banco Santander outsourcing all IT operations to Andersen 
Consulting. The outsourcing deal compromised systems integration and business process management. Furthermore, 
the role of chief information officer (CIO) was performed by an Andersen Consulting partner. The deal did not 
satisfy BS’s hopes that IT could follow the bank’s strategy; hence, IT was back sourced in 1995.  
Partenón 
In the early 1990s, the Banco de España appointed Alfredo Sáenz as chairman of Banesto, which was then in deep 
trouble. Banco Santander finally acquired the Banesto bank in 1994 and Alfredo Sáenz was retained as Banesto 
chairman. Despite Banco Santander’s acquisition of Banesto, the latter remained a quasi-autonomous firm within the 
group and was driven by a quest for greater efficiency. When Alfredo Sáenz arrived at Banesto, he and José María 
Fuster
6
 oversaw the implementation of a new IT platform from scratch, called Partenón (see Exhibit 1), which was 
designed at a cost of €70 million.  
According to analysts,
7
 Partenón was ahead of its time in the banking world. Firstly, Partenón provided what 
Santander calls ‘a single customer view’ and integrated information. Staff in any part of the business could easily 
access customer information from another division, meaning they could assess credit risks more efficiently. This 
resulted in more efficient operations, more secure loan management, and greater commercial capacity. The Partenón 
platform used a single database and all of a customer’s relationships with the bank were automatically linked 
through a single view of customer data. This database showed a complete banking history: meaning that mortgages, 
deposits, cash management, cards, brokerage services, or insurance products, etc. were linked and visible to 
employees. Putting customer data at every department’s fingertips meant staff in one part of the business could 
easily access customer information from another division, and this led to opportunities for cross-selling and up-
selling. This, in turn, meant much more accurate assessment of credit risks. Moreover, Partenón provided fine detail 
regarding customer needs, facilitated customer segmentation, and enabled service provision through multiple 
channels. On top of Partenón, Banesto developed and launched in 2004 a front office system called Alhambra, 
which aimed to further automate front office applications (CRM,
8
 portals, etc). According to José Maria Fuster:
9
  
‘Alhambra complements the Partenón core banking system with a flexible and easy to use front-end 
solution, focused on providing local banks with customised tools to increase commercial effectiveness, 
streamline customer services, and improve the multi-channel end customer experience’.  
Partenón as an IT platform enabled straight through processing between front office systems and the original back 
office system. This integration was called flat back office. As Fuster, pointed out:   
‘Implementing Partenón has given us this flat back office capacity. This means that no matter how much 
work there is, you do not have to increase the headcount. A labour-intensive back office might need 100 
people to manage one million cardholders, and nearly 200 people to process two million cardholders. With 
a flat model, you need fewer than 100 staff to do one million or two million cards. Technology takes care 
of the volume increase’.
10
 
Likewise, straight through processing enabled the bank to streamline the whole process between back office and 
front office and optimise the speed at which transactions were processed: 
‘About 80% of the work that a traditional back office does is either unnecessary or involves putting 
mistakes right. You need people to bridge systems and to make manual checks on customer information, 
                                                          
6 Fuster was initially IT manager and later manufacturing manager of Banesto from 1988 until 2003. He had previously held executive IT positions at Citibank and 
Natwest Bank in the eighties where he led the development of a new core system termed SIGIP to adapt UK procedures to the Spanish context. 
7 European CEO Magazine (http://www.europeanceo.com/news/home/ceo-profiles/article553.html):   
8 Customer relationship management. 
9 Thomas, H. ‘Meet the architect’, Financial Services Technology, Issue 3, 2010, http://www.fsteurope.com/article/Meet-the-architect/ 
10 ‘Shape shifting’, The Banker, 1 December 2007 
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IT priorities at Santander: the Partenón roll-out (2002-2004) 
Despite several attempts to restructure and streamline the IT architecture at Grupo Santander during the 1990s, the 
architecture in the early of the next decade was based on multiple independent systems with limited interaction. 
There were many legacy systems from previous acquisitions, and it was difficult for systems to ‘talk to one another’ 
given that they were developed at different points in space and time. Meanwhile Banesto, being an autonomous 
entity within the group, was used as a test-bed for new technology, and as a business model for Grupo Santander’s 
pioneering IT applications, such as Partenón.   
When Santander began its acquisition of Banesto, top management saw the value of Banesto’s IT system and 
governance. As a result of some restructuring at the executive level of Grupo Santander, Alfredo Sáenz and José 
María Fuster, both at Banesto, took over as CEO and CIO of Grupo Santander, respectively. In addition, Grupo 
Santander decided to implement Partenón throughout the wider company and defined a plan to migrate Santander’s 
core systems to the new platform. As Botín noted, ‘Pulling off a project on this scale requires vision and a Herculean 
effort’. According to Fuster, this decision entailed having to develop fewer new applications than would otherwise 
have been the case if they had rebuilt the system from scratch. It also meant there was greater confidence in IT and 
back-office cost reductions given that the system had already been tested in Banesto.  
Grupo Santander spent €190 million on the project, which was carried out between 2002 and 2004. The total 
synergies of the project were €259 million; and this represented 13.8% of Santander’s domestic retail cost base as of 
2002 (see Exhibit 2). The number of back-office employees was halved in three years, from 12.1% to 6.1% of the 
total workforce. Sáez commented:  
‘Over the three years of the project, the Partenón system was introduced in thousands of the bank’s 
branches throughout Spain and was followed by the early retirement of 3,000 staff. With this new platform, 
the group could focus on cost reduction and improve customer service for further mergers and acquisitions 
such as the takeover of Banco Central Hispanoamericano (2001-2003). The measures yielded cost savings 
of 5.4%’.  
Partenón provides valuable, up-to-date customer information to front office staff. In addition, interaction between 
branch staff and Partenón gives detailed information on sales, thus improving sales effectiveness and reducing 
operational costs (see Figure 1). Fuster added:  
‘We constantly try to give customers added value while reducing costs. However, it is a trade-off – we have 
to strike a balance between the two if we are to maximise profits’.
12
  
     
                                                          
11 Ibid.  
12 ‘José María Fuster,’ The Banker, 6 February 2006 
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Figure 1: Margin vs. Admin and IT costs in Banesto (1998-2003) 
                  
GS management values the fact that Partenón provides front-office staff with a single view of each customer’s 
banking history. Fuster added: 
‘The Spanish model is customer-centric whereas the Anglo-Saxon model is product-centric. Go to many 
UK banks and the card division does not talk to the insurance division as the focus is on product 
profitability. In Spain, it is customer profitability that counts’. 
IT governance at Santander 
The IT division at Banco Santander consisted of some 2,000 staff working on new project developments, as well as 
interaction with business units and production platforms. Grupo Santander had also created several firms specialised 
in various IT areas: Isban, Produban and Geoban. These firms provided services to the business units of the group 
(see Exhibit 3). Fuster added:  
‘We outsource the process not the software. We fully understand and manage the process using external 
parties.
13
 We outsource some things and we use components from third parties – but if you lose the ability 
to build [technology] yourself, you fail’.
14
 
Despite Banesto being run as an autonomous entity, Banco Santander and Banesto used the same platform and 
shared 80% of the costs.
15
 This governance model enabled Grupo Santander to reduce IT staff in Banesto by 25% 
and cut 200 jobs in back-office operations. This new model led to cost savings of €48 million between 1998 and 
2003 and a 24.6% rise in profit margins. 
Abbey Bank: The market tires of success? 
Abbey National was Britain’s second-largest home lender in 2004, managing assets of €266.2 billion and €150.6 
billion (£100 billion) of mortgages in the UK
16
 (see Figure 2), and had 1.8 million shareholders. Abbey pioneered 
innovative business approaches such as Costa Coffee shops in its branches and introduced a franchising scheme that 
                                                          
13 ‘The IT dividend', The Banker, 5 June  2006 
14 ‘José María Fuster’, The Banker, 6 February 2006 
15 ‘Botín earns her spurs at Banesto’, The Banker, 6 June 2005. 
16 ‘Spanish bank offers £8 billion for Abbey’, The Guardian, www.guardian.co.uk, May 2004  
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gave branch managers a greater say in how they ran things. However, business results gave losses of €2 billion (£1.3 
billion) in 2003 and €760 million (£504 million) in 2004 (see Figure 2). 
Abbey’s roots date back to 1849, with the establishment of the National Freehold Land and Building Society. In 
1944, it merged with the Abbey National Building Society to form Abbey National. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
Abbey National gained a reputation for being innovative. It was an early user of computer systems and in the late 
1970s all branches adopted an on-line real-time system for keeping customer accounts. Juan María Olaizola (now 
Director for Manufacturing at Abbey), explained:  
‘Abbey in the 1950s and 60s gained enormous popularity in the UK. Many Britons still recall that their first 
mortgage was with the Abbey National. The building society gave mortgages when no one else would and 
became very successful as a result. Abbey grew and merged with other building societies. It was the first to 
put cash dispensers on high streets, launch a current account as a saving bank, and introduce computers. It 
was highly innovative’. 
On the 12 July 1989, Abbey was the first building society to become a PLC [public limited company] and was 
floated on the London Stock Exchange. In August 1996, Abbey National merged with the National and Provincial 
Building Society. Abbey gained almost 200 branches and three million customers in the process.  
Since the 1990s, Abbey adopted an aggressive strategy of diversification into corporate and investment banking that 
pleased City observers. An executive at Abbey retrospectively noted:  
‘Various City analysts started extolling the virtues of diversification. Abbey fell for the siren song. It was a 
paradox – the market seemed to have tired of winners. Successful firms were given a lot of stick – it was as 
if success stuck in some people’s craw’.  
The new businesses included: bond investments; financing companies; train maintenance; ship insurance and loan 




Lloyds TSB proposed a takeover of Abbey National in 2001 but the Competition Commission stopped the deal, 
alleging that it would seriously damage the economy and put 9000 jobs at risk. As one member of the Commission 




It was against this sombre background in 2002 that the Abbey tried to rescue itself.
19
 Luqman Arnold was appointed 
CEO and started a major re-organisation. Investments were sold and the bank was split in two, with a retail bank and 
a corporate and investment bank. Properties amounting to €1 billion were sold and then leased back. Large contracts 
were signed for outsourcing the bank’s IT functions.
20
 
However, the turnabout was slow and Abbey was left vulnerable to a new bid. Abbey redesigned the bank’s 740 
branches and tried to revamp its brand and make products easier to understand. Although Abbey was Britain’s 
second largest mortgage lender, it had been losing ground and was targeted by other banks. Bank of Ireland made a 
merger proposal in 2002 but the offer was rejected. There were rumours in 2003 that The Royal Bank of Scotland 
and BNP Paribas were interested. However, none of these approaches came to anything, either because Abbey 
National turned the bid down or because the competition authorities blocked the proposal. 
                                                          
17 ‘Spanish bank offers £8bn for Abbey’, The Guardian, www.guardian.co.uk, May 2004 
18 www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/tuc-urges-byers-to-refer-lloyds-bid-for-abbey-690586.html 
19 Ibid. 
20 Santander Central Hispano and Abbey synergies. Smith Barney Global Markets, 11 August 2004 
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 Abbey Group in 2004 
• 724  branch offices 
• 26,000  employees 
• +8400  in  Back office 
• +2000  in IT 
• Indicators : 
• 21 m   customers 13m  assets 
• 4.5 m  accounts and 14  m  saving accounts 
• 8m  debit cards 
• £ 100,000 m.  Mortgages 
• Losses of   (£ 1332) m in 2003; and  (£ 504) m in 2004 
 
Figure 2: Key indicators - The Abbey Group in 2004 
Abbey’s IT systems in 2004 
Abbey had 454 different applications running on 11 different platforms. ‘This made it very hard to consolidate 
customer data,’ said one manager. Many of these platforms had separate data sets. The core system at Abbey ran on 
a Unisys platform that was approaching the end of its useful life. Maintenance was costly and developments were 
both complex and expensive. Abbey ran five data centres and multiple legacy systems that they had gained when the 
Scottish Mutual and Scottish Provident insurance companies were acquired. The bank also had a network of 724 
branch offices connected to data processing centres through 250 Kbps telecommunication lines.  
Abbey achieved 64% efficiency on its IT operations and IT expenditure over ordinary margin was 13%. However, 
the lack of automation was apparent in the 1 to 3 ratio of back office to front office staff (see Exhibit 4). One 
executive noted that many sales and customer operations required manual intervention. 
Key banking processes were still carried out manually. For example, account assignment (the procedure by which 
new customers were allocated a bank account) was tortuous in the extreme. The Abbey clerk would get up, vanish 
into the office, write down an account number from a list and then score it off. He then photocopied the customer’s 
ID and made up a folder for the back-office staff. Branches would send this information on blue sheets and the back-
office would return the information on red sheets. ‘You can imagine how time-consuming and error-prone this all 
was,’ said one manager.  
IT investment priorities at Abbey 
At the turn of this century, Abbey had launched two major IT innovation projects to revamp the company. In 2002 
Abbey launched the ‘One on One’ project, which was expected to deliver on the Abbey National brand vision of 
‘Making Customers’ Lives Easier’ by improving service in critical fields, such as anticipating financial needs and 
delivering on promises. Secondly, the programme would increase sales productivity. Finally, the programme would 
increase the number of profitable customers through improved cross-selling and business retention. Ambrose 
McGinn, e-commerce and strategic development director at Abbey National, said:
21
  
‘One on One is an exciting project that will definitely make our customers’ lives easier. The success 
of the ‘One on One’ programme largely depended on the deployment of Siebel eFinance and its ‘out 
of the box’ functionality. With Siebel eFinance, Abbey aims to unite 15 million customer records, 
maximise sales, and enhance customer satisfaction and loyalty.’ 
                                                          
21 http://www.crm2day.com/content/t6_librarynews_1.php?news_id=EpEApFkkVAokZRQoDX, September 2010 
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This investment would cost some €60 million and enable the bank to treat its customers as individuals because it 
would offer an all-embracing view of each client in a single system that ran across branch and call-centre channels. 
This single view included customer details, product holdings, contact history, and prompt messages. To deliver this 
single view, Siebel eBusiness Applications would interface with Abbey National’s legacy systems.  
Abbey also announced an ambitious VoIP (voice over Internet protocol) project in 2003. Abbey contracted an 
outsourcing deal, valued at €188 million (£125 million), with BT for a new IP virtual private network that would 
connect all its branches and the five call-centres and enable the bank to run all its telephony and data over a single 
network. Abbey’s officials expected this project would benefit Abbey in two ways. Firstly, the initiative would lead 
to improved workforce efficiency; and secondly, new applications would deliver better customer service. Yasmin 
Jetha, executive director of IT at Abbey, said ‘the move to the new network would allow the company to deploy new 
applications, such as customer relationship management software, more efficiently and at the same time help to 
reduce costs.’ 
IT Governance at Abbey 
Abbey’s information technology division was mainly tasked with developing new applications, while the operations 
division was responsible for back office operations. Olaizola remarked:  
‘If the in-house IT applications failed to meet the bank’s needs, that created problems at the back office 
end. If back office processing wasn’t up to scratch, IT got the blame. This made it much more likely that 
Abbey’s back office would end up with poorly-developed applications. The corollary to this was that the IT 
group would have to spend a lot of time and effort patching up faulty programmes. Teamwork is vital 
because no application works perfectly the first time round and the back office has to continue doing its job 
while things are sorted out’.  
In 2001, the bank decided to outsource a sizeable chunk of its business. Firstly, Abbey signed a ten-year €326 
million (£217 million) deal with EDS to outsource mortgage processing. Secondly, Abbey sold its credit card 
business to MBNA. Abbey outsourced control of its desktop infrastructure in 2003 to Computacenter in a five-year 
deal that was worth €105 million (£70 million). Yasmin Jetha said, ‘The desktop managed service proposition 
provided by Computacenter will enable Abbey National to become more efficient while also increasing flexibility to 
meet future business needs’.  
Abbey also signed a deal with Getronics in 2003 to refit its entire branch IT infrastructure with personal computers, 
flat screens, laser and network printers, as well as passbook printers. Such deals, however, were not always 
welcomed by analysts. As Octavio Marenzi, chief executive of the financial services consultancy Celent 
Communications, observed:  
‘What Abbey has done with Getronics is like putting lipstick on a pig – its back end has all kinds of 
ugly systems in place’.
22
 
The Jack Project 
At the beginning of 2004, Santander’s capitalisation was €38 billion, while Abbey’s capitalisation was €18 billion. 
Santander’s management wanted Abbey assets and aimed to lever its current commercial and technological policies 
and resources to tap Abbey’s potential. Santander’s managerial team dubbed the operation ‘The Jack Project’ and 
began preparing a synergy strategy for an Abbey-Santander merger that would make the acquisition viable. The idea 
was to go beyond the dominant paradigm of generating synergies through short-term cost cuts by closing branches, 
departments, firing staff, and eliminating duplication. The key idea was to lever IT platforms and IT governance 
models to make the acquisition safe in the knowledge of the some €300 million required to substitute existing IT at 
Abbey and implement Partenón. 
                                                          
22 Chris Nuttall, ‘SCH believes IT could save Abbey £307m’, Financial Times, 11 September 2004 
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The IT-centric story 
The ‘Jack Project’ was being developed as IT-centric and organised as such. Banco Santander put IT governance at 
the heart of its mergers & acquisitions strategy, and specifically Partenón, as its digital platform. Olaizola 
commented:  
‘When Partenón was deployed, Isban acquired the role of the group’s software factory which could roll out 
new applications to new business areas more easily, thus cutting costs. Moreover, in 2003, Santander 
estimated that its IT system saved €250 million a year through process simplification and by cutting 
equipment and subcontracting costs’. 
According to Fuster, this approach facilitated a rapid implementation in many subsidiaries and business units. Isban 
was also responsible for updating and maintaining the system. Fuster explained:  
‘Our M&A experience taught us that integrating bank IT systems after an acquisition is always tricky, 
given the millions of customer records involved and the potential for disruption in customer services. Those 
systems must be kept up and running 24 hours a day. If anything goes awry, customer confidence is 
undermined and that dents the bank’s reputation’.  
In other words, the idea was to deploy Partenón and the IT governance model. Said Fuster:  
‘We considered that the operation could represent adding staff and non-staff synergies amounting to €315 
million by 2007/08. The critical issue was to deploy Partenón business processes, best practices, and the 
commercial culture associated with it. Partenón was the starting point. Naturally, we needed to carry out 
fieldwork using published data to support the idea. We also needed to draw up an action plan to implement 
the project as effectively and efficiently as possible’. 
The Santander management team had a great deal of experience in the field. When Banco Central Hispanoamericano 
and Banco Santander merged, superfluous branches were closed and the back-office, computing and support 
departments were all unified. To carry out a cross-border acquisition of this size, the team needed to gain in-depth 
understanding of the British banking model and perhaps work with local partners. 
February – May 2004: replicating Partenón at Abbey?    
Santander management decided to wait and refrain from commenting on press reports about its interest in Abbey 
that appeared from January 2004. After waiting for calmer waters in the financial market, in April and May 2004, 
Fuster drew up ‘The Jack Project’ in two stages. The first stage was a short to medium-term plan of action that 
identified the scope for savings after taking over Abbey. The second stage set the priorities in using IT to slash costs 
and exploit synergies. ‘We had complete faith in Partenón’, said Fuster. Santander’s management was confident that 
cultural barriers to IT implementation were not an issue since Partnenón had been developed from scratch as a 
multi-language, multi-banking platform. Fuster expected the new system to be implemented locally by Abbey’s 
personnel and by IT staff at Santander (who were fluent in English).  
Based on the 21-month roll-out of Partenón in Santander, Fuster thought that the project at Abbey could be achieved 
in three years at a cost of some €300 million. This led to the idea that Partenón could be implemented by January 
2007 at Abbey. There would be two stages, the first being to replicate Partenón, and the second to implement the 
commercial model throughout the branch network.  
Fuster explained:   
‘For the replication stage, we needed three months to technically validate the project before it was 
launched. Over the next 18 months, the operating gap was covered, a plan for parallel running of the 
systems was drawn up, quality programs were established to test the information, a new back office was set 
up and an office implementation plan prepared’. 
May 2004: The Villa Magna meeting  
A confidential meeting was held between Santander and Abbey management teams in early May 2004 to discuss the 
priorities of the operation to reach an agreement. The venue was Hotel Villa Magna in Madrid. Fuster carried out his 
 Busquets et. al. / Santander Acquires Abbey: The Jack Project 
  
 Conference on Information Systems, St. Louis 2010 11 
initial analysis and came up with compelling arguments for pursuing the project (see Exhibit 4). One of the few 
slides shown at the meeting covered the retail banking business.  
The first priority was to improve sales efficiency. According to Fuster, the main aim was to cut the Abbey back 
office/front office ratio to the level at Santander. On this basis, Santander planned to cut some 6,000 jobs: ‘Staff 
costs were 66% and the rest needed to be achieved with a new operating model and the deployment of Partenón’, 
noted an executive at Santander. 
Therefore, the second priority was highly dependent upon management’s ability to leverage Abbey’s core business 
and leading position in the retail markets, and boost cross-selling as part of the single commercial portfolio created 
by Partenón.  
In that meeting Botín, Sáez, and Gomez Roldán considered that in order to make Partenón successful, Abbey needed 
to embrace a new commercial culture. Indeed, Fuster considered that Partenón required significant changes in the 
working system. Conversations with Abbey management and trade unions had gone well, with agreement reached 
on early retirements and changing fixed salaries for sales staff to an 80:20 fixed/variable salary ratio according to 
sales objectives. Fuster added:  
‘We also needed to develop a communication plan to clearly explain Partenón’s enormous potential for 
boosting sales and what that meant in terms of performance-related bonus payments’.  
Although the Villa Magna meeting was a turning point in the M&A strategy, Santander’s interest in Abbey was 
leaked again to the press in May 2004 and the operation was put on hold as Abbey’s share price briefly rose on the 
news.  
June 2004: preparing the road show   
Botín wanted to buy Abbey for €13 billion (£8.6 billion). He asked the executive team to wait until market rumours 
had vanished in May. Once the bid was formally made, the next step was preparing the arguments for the road show 
to convince opinion leaders and investors in the main European and American financial markets about the feasibility 
of the planned acquisition. Alfredo Sáenz asked José María Fuster to take responsibility for the road show since the 
main arguments for the Abbey merger were based on IT. The main worry for the Santander team was that Abbey 
might sink before Santander could take the helm. Takeovers fuel speculation – something that had happened in the 
past. As a Santander executive explained:  
‘You have to act fast – you can’t spend two years dithering around with a takeover bid because that gives 
the target company’s board the jitters. The chances are the directors will abandon ship. Everyone comes off 
badly when that happens. That was one of our biggest fears’. 
The Santander team was concerned that key parts of the business had been outsourced, such as mortgages to EDS 
and credit cards to MBNA. The property leaseback arrangements stretched to 2022, tying up assets and limiting the 
scope for synergy. Fuster had studied the UK market and now had a good idea of the gaps. He later remarked:  
‘Partenón was the key. We felt the merger could go ahead only if Partenón’s role was unquestionable. We 
had analysed it, spoken to people about it, hired people to carry out market studies. It was absolutely vital. 
We knew about the gaps on our side but we didn’t know about the ones in Abbey’. 
Decisions 
The plane was on its final approach to Madrid airport when Fuster reviewed both the arguments and the next steps to 
be taken. During June, he and his team had to present the Jack Project to investors and stakeholders. Fuster looked 
again at the project report, which was the key element for preparing the road show to sell the idea to the major 
worldwide financial markets. Fuster and Sáenz knew that the plan had been prepared from public sources and that 
this posed a significant risk because they did not know the real state of affairs inside Abbey. Gómez Roldán 
considered that that operation should be leveraged by applying Santander’s tried and tested ‘proximity strategy’ with 
its sales and commercial policies. One argument was that scrapped manual processes would be replaced by 
automated processes, leading to greater efficiency in the branches.  
Although Fuster and his team planned to deploy Partenón to secure competitive advantage, this was a medium-term 
objective. Sáez and Fuster considered that a short-term plan was needed in order to create trust in the market and 
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enable Santander’s team to prepare and deploy Partenón in Abbey premises. Management also considered the IT 
priorities. Should Santander staff integrate the current multi-million IT initiatives in Abbey such as IP networking 
and the ‘One to One’ CRM initiative? Alternatively, should they be discarded and the losses written off?  
Some managers considered that Partenón was the key to boosting staff sales productivity and improving customer 
service in the Santander Group. However, what if UK customer behaviour and commercial culture was too far 
removed from this hypothesis? If Partenón was going to be deployed, should Santander concentrate Abbey software 
production at Isban in Spain? Maybe it was time to think about decentralising software production. What were the 
best choices to create synergies?  
Just as the plane touched down, Fuster was mulling over arguments to prepare a sound proposition for the road show 
and persuade the markets about the IT-centric acquisition. Sáez, Fuster and Gómez Roldán took a car to Santander’s 
headquarters to discuss the next steps with Botín. Fuster was also thinking about who would manage the operation in 
London during this period if the merger was agreed. If the operation was successful, Fuster was wondering how to 
deal with the unexpected. 
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Exhibit 1: Partenón architecture 
Partenón is the core banking system that was developed and implemented at Grupo Santander between 1995 and 
2005. Although it was designed as back office, Partenón today covers the whole company’s operating model 
(including the front office named ‘Alhambra’ and the back office). It creates value through improved control, 
quality, and efficiency. Its architecture enables integrated, multi-channel customer management, short time-to-





• Single view of the customer 
• Multi-channel 
• Single catalogue of products and services for 
commercial use 
• Oriented towards bank operations rather than 
accounting transactions 
• Common architecture for all the banking operations 
• Integrated information for different areas of the bank 
• High quality operational and managerial data 
 
 
Santander has a system architecture comprising of various layers:  
• Alhambra:  
• Channel management: systems intended to manage relationships with customers during branch 
sales, and at call-centres or on web portals. 
• Brand management where needed in different subsidiaries.   
• Partenón: the core bank application is based on system modules such as account management, cash 
settlements, mortgages, and so on. These activities represent the core business applications of the bank.  
• Analytics:  
• Information through aggregating different modules in order to design and proceed with campaign 
management, market research, or customer behaviour and insights.  
• Risk and financial management is related to the financial control of the institution and legal 
compliance.   
• Technology infrastructure is based on the computer hardware, operating systems, and databases supporting 
business applications (managed in different group ‘factories’ such as Produban and Isban – see Exhibit 3). 
 
                                                          
23
 Thomas, H. ‘Meet the architect’, Financial Services Technology, Issue 3, 2010, http://www.fsteurope.com/article/Meet-the-architect/ 
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Exhibit 2: Partenón project costs and synergies 
 
 
                         Source: Company reports, Citigroup Smith Barney, 2004 
Costs €190 million.  Synergies €259 million.  
Adapting Banesto platform 
• Software cleaning 
• Functional gap closure 
Meeting pre-requirements 
• Migration to Windows 
• Data centre transport  
Implementation in Santander 
• Creation IT platform 
• Coexistence IT platforms and integrated 
checking  
• Quality tests  
Operating implementation 
• Personnel training  
Improve Banesto platform 
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 created at Banesto, develops software and integration services that are common to the group businesses.  
Produban manages the group telecommunications and data processing centres.  
Geoban manages the operations and back-office of the group businesses.  
                                                          
24 Ingenieria de Software Bancario, S.A. (http://www.isban.es) 
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Exhibit 4: Comparison Abbey/Santander  
Table 1: Abbey’s employee base at June 2004. Source: Abbey reports, 2004 
Customer sales 12,225 
Customer positions 366 
Customer operations (back office) 8,466 
Human resources 531 
Information technology 2,049 




Table 2: Abbey personnel expenses synergies derived from Partenón implementation (in 
euros) Source: Santander reports, Smith Barney Global markets, 2004 
Description    
Number of employee reduced 6,000 
Average salary  €35,000 
Total personnel synergies  €210m.  
 
Table 3: Comparison Abbey/Santander (May 2004). Source: Grupo Santander 
 Abbey Santander 
Back office/front office ratio   33 % 6 % 
Employees per branch office 15.5 8 
% IT expenses vs. ordinary margin 13% 6-9% 
Efficiency ratio  62% 50% 
    
Table 4: Mortgages sold through different channels.  Source Deloitte, September 2004 
 UK  Abbey 2003 
Mortgages sold through   
Branches  40% (average) 20%  
Tele Sales  21% (average) 10% 
Third Channels  39% (average)  70% 




HBOS: 116%  
UK Average: 89% 
33%  
Number of products per customer  UK average: 2,07 For 7.5m of 11m of 
Abbey’s customers, the 
average number of 
products used was 1.07. 
                                   
